ABSTRACT: From 1994, Bradshaw (2004 finds that analysts' stock recommendations relate negatively to residual income valuation estimates but positively to valuation heuristics based on the price-to-earnings-to-growth ratio and long-term growth. These results are surprising, especially considering that future returns relate positively to residual income valuation estimates and negatively to heuristics. Using a large sample of analysts for the 1993-2005 period, we consider whether recent regulatory reforms affect this apparent inconsistent analyst behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Using an extensive sample of sell-side financial analysts, we first examine how Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and other recent regulatory reforms (e.g., NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Research Analysts Settlement) affect the relation between analysts' stock recommendations and (1) theoretically-derived residual income models versus (2) valuation heuristics based on the price-to-earnings to growth (PEG) ratios and long-term growth (LTG) forecasts. Our second set of tests involves one-year-ahead excess stock returns. We examine the impact of regulations on relation between future returns and (1) stock recommendations, (2) residual income models, and (3) valuation heuristics. Finally, we consider the extent to which residual income models and valuation heuristics are incremental to stock recommendations in explaining future returns after regulations are implemented.
This research is important because it speaks directly to an issue of great interest to investors and regulators: To what extent do regulations impact financial information provided by an important user group (i.e., financial analysts)? Given the widespread availability of financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, our results have practical importance to the investment community and regulators, as well as implications for academic research. While our first set of tests provides understanding of how analysts incorporate their own earnings forecasts into their stock recommendations, our tests of future returns have direct importance to investors. Furthermore, given the historical problems associated with stock recommendations, the extent to which valuation estimates (based on analysts' earnings forecasts) provide explanatory power beyond stock recommendations for future returns will be particularly important to investors. 1 1 We do not suggest that all investors use both analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations when making investment decisions. Sophisticated investors may use analysts' earnings forecasts and ignore their stock Presumably, analysts use their own publicly issued earnings forecasts to derive intrinsic value estimates. In this case, one should expect these estimates to relate to analysts' stock recommendations (e.g., Schipper 1991) . When earnings-based intrinsic value estimates are above (below) the current stock price, analysts would issue a buy (sell) recommendation. If instead, analysts' recommendations are based on other factors (beyond sophisticated earnings-based valuation estimates), then valuation estimates may provide incremental explanatory power beyond recommendations for future stock performance.
In an interesting recent study, Bradshaw (2004) uses a sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 1998 and finds that residual income valuations, developed using analysts' earnings forecasts, do not relate as expected with analysts' recommendations. Analysts give more favorable recommendations to stocks with lower residual income valuations relative to current price. 2 Instead, analysts' recommendations align more closely with their LTG forecasts and the PEG ratio. These findings suggest that analysts give the highest recommendations to growth stocks, and among growth stocks, they give the highest recommendations to the firms for which the value of growth estimated by the PEG model exceeds the current stock price. Bradshaw (2004) concludes that analysts rely on simple heuristics rather than more sophisticated residual income valuations to recommend stocks. earnings forecasts are useful inputs into residual income valuation models, yet they tend to relate negatively or insignificantly to analysts' stock recommendations. Furthermore, LTG forecasts, which most closely align with analysts recommendations, relate negatively to future returns. It seems that analysts recommend stocks with strong growth potential, even if such potential is already impounded into the stock price. Consistent with these results, Bradshaw (2004) shows that stock recommendations are not significantly associated with buy-and-hold one-year future returns. 4 Recommendations do not appear to capture stocks' intrinsic values relative to their current prices.
Why do analysts appear to avoid using their valuable earnings forecasts in a sophisticated manner in setting their recommendations (i.e., fail to practice what they preach)? This surprising result makes this area of research interesting and motivates further examination of the link between valuation estimates and recommendations, and their relations to future stock returns. It could be that analysts have incentives other than using their recommendations to signal mispriced stocks. In fact, analyst behavior has received wide-spread criticism in the financial press and several groups have called for reforms to the analyst industry. 5 We examine how recent regulations (e.g., Reg FD, NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Research Analysts Settlement) affect the way valuation estimates map into recommendations and subsequently relate to future stock returns. Specifically, we test for differences in these relations between the 1993-1999 and 2000-2005 periods to determine the impact of Reg FD. Then, we tests for differences between the 2000-2002 and 2003-2005 periods to test for effects of other regulations. 4 Other recent studies find mixed results on the usefulness of stock recommendations (Womack 1996; Barber et al. 2001 Barber et al. , 2003 Mikhail et al. 2004; Li 2005; Gleason et al. 2007 ). 5 Boni and Womack (2002) provide a useful overview of these issues and list many references to both practitioner and research articles. In the next section we summarize the related literature and discuss our framework for analyzing the analyst/investor relation, highlight objectives of recent regulations (and discuss some research findings related to these regulations), and present our hypotheses. In Section III we briefly describe the valuation models, and in Section IV we discuss our sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section V provides our main empirical findings as well as results from additional analyses. Section VI concludes.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we first describe the framework in which we analyze the analyst/investor relation. Then we focus on identifying factors that can affect this relation when examining analysts before and after recent regulatory reforms. Finally, we present our hypotheses.
Analyst/Investor Relation
Schipper (1991) encourages research to help better understand how earnings forecasts relate to stock recommendations. She argues that forecasts should be viewed as an input into producing a final output (i.e., a recommendation) and not just a standalone final output. We expect the following relations between analysts and investors. First, analysts gather firm-specific, industry-specific, and economy-wide information to generate earnings forecasts. Next, analysts input these earnings forecasts into a valuation model to compute an intrinsic value of the firm. analysts' work environments on the above relations.
Mitigating Factors
Several factors provide possible explanations for Bradshaw's surprising results. For example, after issuing an earnings forecast, the analyst might not employ rigorous valuation 6 Details on these four models appear in Section III. 7 Frankel and Lee (1998) also find a positive relation between residual income valuations and future stock performance. 8 Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001) find that recommendation changes are associated with future stock returns. Other recent studies find mixed results on the usefulness of stock recommendations (Barber et al. 2003; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2004; Li 2005; Gleason et al. 2007 ). The combined evidence suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts provide useful information for measuring intrinsic values but that analysts' recommendations do not. Barber et al. (2006) suggest that market prices react slowly to the information contained in recommendations. models but instead rely on simple heuristics, whereas investors rely on more sophisticated residual income models. Bradshaw finds evidence consistent with LTG forecasts being the most important determinant of stock recommendations, regardless of the degree to which these expectations are already impounded in stock prices. These results suggest that analysts tend to rely on valuation heuristics to a greater extent than on more "theoretically driven" residual income models. Gleason et al. (2007) are also consistent with analysts' use of simple heuristics rather than more rigorous residual income models.
In addition, in setting their recommendations, analysts may consider factors other than the intrinsic value estimates relative to current stock prices. Rather than maximizing gains to investors, analysts may be serving personal objectives, such as increasing their compensation, improving relations with management, garnering investment banking business for the brokerage firm, "hyping" the stock to garner brokerage trading volumes, and increasing the value of shares personally owned (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999, 2005; Ertimur et al. 2007; Ke and Yu 2007) . For example, Gimein (2002) claims that investment advice offered by analysts is "so dishonest and fraught with conflicts of interest that it has become worthless" (see also Heflin et al. 2003) . As evidence of this, prior research demonstrates that affiliated analysts (i.e., those having direct investment banking business with the firm) issue more optimistic forecasts (Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 2000) . Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998) and Lim (2001) 
Regulatory Reforms
In recent years several important developments in the regulatory environment have affected sell-side financial analysts, and these reforms have the potential to significantly change analysts' incentives or behavior and therefore their output (e.g., earnings forecasts and stock recommendations). Our study tests whether relations between recommendations and valuation 9 Francis et al. (2004) provide an in-depth review of the evidence on security analyst independence and conclude that there is strong evidence that U.S. analysts behave in a biased manner. Using the tests in Bradshaw (2004), Barniv et al. (2008) investigate common law versus code law countries and conclude that analyst bias is more pervasive in common law countries. This result is consistent with analysts' stock recommendations in common law countries being affected more by factors other than identifying mispriced stocks. 10 Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that recommendation levels are positively related to subsequent returns only for firms with favorable quantitative characteristics such as value stocks and positive momentum stocks. Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001) examine changes in analysts' recommendations and conclude that these are positively associated with future excess returns. In this paper, we choose to follow Bradshaw (2004) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and examine recommendation levels. First, we want to be able to compare our results with those in Bradshaw (2004) . Second, we want to examine recommendations the way a non-computer generated trading investor would process recommendations. Such an investor would find a stock, check out the outstanding recommendations, and then buy/not buy/sell. 11 For example, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) report that approximately 80 percent of the recommendations are Buy or Strong Buy, and only five percent are Sell or Strong Sell.
estimates are affected by changes in the regulatory environment over time and thus sheds light on whether potential changes in the relations are consistent with the objectives of the reforms. 12 Using the extent of a multinational firm's international operations to proxy for analysts' need to gather privileged information from management, Herrmann et al. (2008) show that the relation between forecast bias (optimism) and international diversification significantly declines (and even disappears) in the post-Reg FD period. investors, allegedly because of investment banking incentives. 15 In particular, the settlement discloses that analysts issued positive public information that conflicted with their negative views about the stock (De Franco et al. 2007) . In other words, as discussed above, investment banking incentives can lead to misleading analyst behavior.
16
There is some evidence that these regulations have impacted analysts' recommendations. Kadan et al. (2006) show that prior to these regulations, analysts were 40 percent more likely to issue an optimistic recommendation for stocks that had recently undergone an initial public offering or seasoned equity offering. This probability increased by an additional 12 percent when the recommendation was made by an affiliated analyst. These effects vanished after regulations.
Barber et al. (2006) (2007) and Ke and Yu (2007) show that the improvement is analysts' recommendations around recent regulations was greater for analysts that likely faced higher conflicts of interest.
17
In summary, recent regulations have addressed bias in analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. If these regulations have had their intended effects, we should observe 15 The settlement also enforces the brokerage firms to make structural changes in the production and dissemination of analyst research. 16 The SEC further issued several releases governing investment firms' disclosure practices in 2003 (e.g., Regulation Analyst Certification, AC, 2003) . Regulation AC requires certifications by analysts that the views expressed in their research reports accurately reflect their personal views. Analysts are required to disclose whether they receive any direct or indirect compensation for their reports. Analysts who cannot certify that they have not received compensation for a specific report must disclose the magnitude and source of the compensation. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act came into effect in 2002, potentially affecting the quality of financial reporting and thus the work of financial analysts.
an increase in the usefulness of analysts' output -earnings forecasts and stock recommendations.
This leads us to the following set of hypotheses.
H1: Following recent regulations, the relation between analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecast-based residual income (heuristic) valuations is expected to become more (less) positive.
H2: Following recent regulations, the relation between earnings forecast-based residual income valuations and future stock returns is expected to become more positive.
H3: Following recent regulations, the relation between analysts' stock recommendations and future stock returns is expected to become more positive.
III. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF VALUATION MODELS
In this section, we briefly describe the valuation models used in this paper. 
The second specification of the residual income valuation model (V RI2 ) assumes that residual income in the terminal year persists in perpetuity, which is a more optimistic assumption than the fade-rate assumption used for 
Barker ( describe the pervasiveness of the use of the "PEG ratio" as a basis for stock recommendations.
For example, Peter Lynch advocates the PEG ratio in his book One Up on Wall Street (Lynch 2000 (2004) uses First Call as his source for analyst data. First Call and I/B/E/S differ in that First Call includes consensus data for a month only if the consensus was revised during the month. I/B/E/S is more comprehensive in that it includes all months, including those with no changes in the consensus. We base our main results on using change months only (consistent with Bradshaw), but we show later in the paper that results are robust to using the full sample of observations. 21 Results are similar if we relax the requirement that LTG forecasts be available (and thus have larger sample sizes). 22 As a sensitivity test near the end of the paper, we discuss results when all months are included. All conclusions are unaffected. In addition, we have estimated all models after excluding consensus recommendations based on just one recommendation and the results are similar to those reported. 23 As discussed below, we find results similar to Bradshaw (2004) for the pre-Reg FD period with a few exceptions.
strong sell recommendations increases from 1.1 to 4.4 percent. The means of V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P significantly increase and V PEG /P and LTG significantly decrease. 24 As expected, firm size (market value of equity) increases. In addition, the number of analysts per firm also increases.
[ Place TABLE 1 here] Consistent with their high recommendation levels, analysts estimate high long-term growth rates (LTG) for the companies they follow -18.9 percent and 18.0 percent for the preand post-Reg FD periods, respectively (and the difference is significant at the one percent level).
In untabulated analyses, we find that the mean actual annual earnings growth is 8.4 percent and 11.5 percent in these periods. These findings suggest that LTG projections are high and optimistically biased, but that this optimism has decreased somewhat in the post-Reg FD period. Panels C and D of Table 1 provide correlations between variables. Consistent with the intent of regulations, the correlations between residual income valuations and stock 24 The fact that the mean recommendation REC is a buy and the mean residual income valuation estimates (V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P) are less than one suggests that analysts rely on more than just these valuations when deciding their stock recommendations (Bradshaw 2004) . Unlike the residual income valuations, the PEG valuation is greater than the current price for the pre-Reg FD period (1.14) but is below current price for the post Reg FD (0.79). 25 One potential alternative reason for the decline in recommendation levels over our sample period could be deteriorating economic conditions. We cannot exclude this possibility. However, it should be noted that recommendations are generally made with the explicit understanding that they represent whether a stock will underperform or outperform the market in general, and not necessarily whether the stock price is expected to decrease or increase. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that poorer economic conditions would lead to reduced recommendations in general.
recommendations increase over time. However, there is an increase in the positive correlation between V PEG /P and recommendations, even though the correlation between V PEG /P and future returns becomes insignificant post Reg FD and then becomes negative after other regulations.
The correlation between residual income valuations and future returns is increasing, but that improvement occurs only around Reg FD. LTG forecasts and residual income valuations are negatively correlated, explaining why residual income valuations and future returns are positively correlated, while LTG forecasts and future returns are negatively correlated. forecasts as the year passes, and forecasts made near the end of the year are more accurate and less optimistic than those made near the beginning of the year. By running the regression for each fiscal month, we prevent mixing short-horizon earnings forecasts with long-horizon forecasts. In other words, we prevent mixing valuation estimates generated from more optimistic, less accurate forecasts (i.e., long-horizon forecasts) with those generated from less optimistic, more accurate forecasts (i.e., short-horizon forecasts). 26 Reported t-statistics are based on the 26 As an example of this issue, we find that V RI1 /P uniformly decreases over the 12-month horizon. The mean of V RI1 /P is 12 percent lower in month t-1 compared to month t-12. The same decreasing pattern is observed for V RI2 /P (14 percent lower in month t-1) and V PEG /P (24 percent lower in month t-1). Thus, Bradshaw's (2004) approach directly controls for this horizon effect in analysts' forecasts.
V. REGRESSION RESULTS

As in
standard error of the monthly coefficients, using the adjustment for serial correlation across months.
27,28
The adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. We estimate the regressions using quintile rankings of the independent variables. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month based on the distribution of the variable in that month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1.
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Tests of Effects of Regulatory Reforms on Relations between Stock Recommendations and Valuation Estimates (Hypothesis 1)
To test the effect of Reg FD on the relation between valuation estimates and stock recommendations, we estimate the following model. . 28 Since each of the fiscal month regressions contains multiple observations for the same firm, there is likely some residual dependence, understating the standard error in each of the monthly regressions. However, the monthly coefficients are unbiased. And since we base our reported t-statistics on the mean of the monthly coefficients (not the monthly standard errors), the reported significance levels are unaffected. 29 We have also estimated the models using five-group, three-group, and two-group (above/below median) ordered logit regressions. Untabulated results show that no inferences are affected with these alternative estimation techniques. Table 3 presents regression results. The coefficients on V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P are significantly negative, indicating that residual income valuations remain significantly negatively related to 30 Coefficient estimates in the post-Reg FD period are as follows (untabulated): V RI1 /P is significantly negative, V RI2 /P is not significantly different from zero, and V PEG /P and LTG are significantly positive. However, the results for the effects of regulations on heuristics-based valuation estimates (V PEG /P and LTG) are mixed for Reg FD and contrary to expectations for other regulations.
Tests of Relations between Future Excess Returns and Valuation Estimates (Hypothesis 2) and Stock Recommendations (Hypothesis 3)
We now turn to testing the relation of future excess returns with both valuation estimates and stock recommendations. We compute one-year-ahead buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns (SAR) as: Table 4 shows regression results for (9) and (10). Consistent with the findings of Frankel and Lee (1998) and Bradshaw (2004), we document that both V RI1 /P and V RI2 /P are positively and significantly related to future excess returns before Reg FD. In addition, we find that this positive relation increases following Reg FD (and in fact doubles). These results provide support for the second hypothesis. The coefficients on LTG and V PEG /P are negatively related to future excess returns prior to Reg FD. The introduction of Reg FD did appear to make V PEG /P significantly less negatively related to future returns (i.e., the interaction is positive and significant at the one percent level). For LTG, on the other hand, there is no significant effect of Reg FD. The final column of Panel A in Table 4 shows that recommendations are negatively related to future excess returns. After enactment of Reg FD, this negative relation persists. This suggests that Reg FD had no impact on the seemingly irrational relation between analyst recommendations and security returns.
[ Place TABLE 4 here] In Panel B, we examine whether valuations are incremental to stock recommendations.
As discussed previously, to the extent that analysts' recommendations are not derived based on valuation models, the two can provide incremental effects. We first note that results for all four valuation estimates (reported in Panel A) and the effects of Reg FD are unaffected by adding recommendations to the regression. This provides further evidence that analysts' stock recommendations are influenced by many other factors. The biggest difference in the pre-Reg FD period is for LTG. Much of this variable's explanatory power is lost when testing for an incremental effect, which is consistent with our earlier result that recommendations appear most closely related to LTG (as opposed to residual income valuations). Results for the post-Reg FD are also very similar. Perhaps the most interesting result is that when controlling for V PEG /P or LTG, the relation between stock recommendations and future excess returns becomes even more negative in the post-Reg FD period. This is not the case for residual income valuations. The ability of residual income valuations to explain future returns prevents the negative relation between recommendations and future returns from becoming increasingly negative. Table 5 Table 5 further demonstrate that other regulations relate primarily to improvements in stock recommendations (as opposed to analysts' earnings forecasts) and this improvement is incremental to valuation estimates based on analysts' earnings forecasts.
[Place TABLE 5 here]
Sensitivity Analyses
Results for observations with no change in consensus
Recall that we base our results on using only monthly observations for which there has been a revision in the consensus recommendation. We use these observations to be consistent with Bradshaw (2004) . However, as a sensitivity analysis, we repeat the tests using the full sample of observations from I/B/E/S data (i.e., including monthly observations with no change in consensus recommendation). This approach has the advantage of significantly increasing the sample size and thus the power of our tests. In fact, the sample size increases to 425,128.
However, the results are quite similar to those reported previously, which provides some assurance that our findings are not unduly influenced by the use of a smaller sample.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level
In Tables 2-5 we report coefficients using the mean coefficient from 12 fiscal month regressions. As an alternative, we consider estimating coefficients using a pooled model and use firm cluster adjusted standard errors. The pooled model has the disadvantage (as discussed previously) of mixing long-horizon and short-horizon earnings forecasts but the advantage of not relying on the average of only 12 monthly coefficients, which potentially reduces statistical power. Under this alternative approach, we find that coefficients are remarkably close to those reported in the tables. All conclusions reported from Tables 2 and 3 (i.e., the relations between stock recommendations and the four valuation estimates) are unaffected.
We do, however, notice some differences for results reported in Tables 4 and 5 (i.e., the relations with future returns). LTG is significantly more negatively related to future returns after Reg FD but significantly less negatively related to future returns after other regulations. These results are consistent with other regulations having their intended effect of reducing analysts' reliance on heuristics in setting stock recommendations. Furthermore, the conclusion that the increasing positive relation between residual income valuations and future returns is attributable primarily attributable to Reg FD (and not other regulations) is even more apparent. In summary, while we note some differences in results, overall conclusions regarding the effectiveness of regulations are unaffected.
Bear market and bull market effects
Our research period can be characterized by periods of primarily a bull market until To test whether our inferences are affected by bull versus bear markets in addition to the effects of regulatory reforms, we re-estimate regressions using bull or bear monthly indicators. 31 The overall tenor of our results is the same. We do find that bull markets have positive effect on analysts' recommendations and excess returns in the pre-Reg FD.
VI. CONCLUSION
To date there has been surprisingly little research on analysts' recommendations and analysts' use of valuation models. A priori, the relation seems straightforward. Analysts input their earnings forecasts into the theoretically correct valuation model, such as a residual income model, to develop a valuation estimate. Analysts compare this valuation to current stock price.
To the extent that the valuation estimate exceeds current stock price, analysts would issue a buy recommendation. Alternatively, if the valuation estimate is below the current stock price, analysts would issue a sell recommendation. Thus, it seems likely that residual income valuations and stock recommendations would have a positive relation and each would relate positively to future returns. Furthermore, if stock recommendations completely capture the information in valuation estimates, then valuation estimates would have no incremental explanatory power for future returns. However, while these arguments seem consistent with rational analyst behavior, prior research documents that these relations do not exist as expected and in some cases exist in the opposite direction.
As an example, Bradshaw (2004) We are interested in the extent to which these regulations had their intended effects.
Using a large sample of stock recommendations over the 1993-2005 period, we first examine the relation between analysts' stock recommendations and (1) theoretically-derived residual income models versus (2) valuation heuristics (i.e., price-to-earnings to growth (PEG) ratio and longterm growth (LTG) forecast). We then examine the relation between future returns and (1) stock recommendations, (2) residual income models, and (3) valuation heuristics. Finally, we consider the extent to which residual income models and valuation heuristics are incremental to stock recommendations in explaining future returns. We examine changes in these relations in the pre- Reg FD period (1994 Reg FD itself rather than other regulations. This finding implies that Reg FD had the effect of increasing the useful of earnings forecasts to investors. Also of interest to investors is our finding that the negative relation between stock recommendations and future returns still persists but is diminishing following regulations subsequent to Reg FD. Thus, it appears that in many ways regulations are having their intended effects but the effects on analysts' outputs may be incomplete. fade-rate assumption. V R12 = residual income valuation with a five-year forecast horizon and a terminal value with a perpetuity assumption. V PEG = forecasted earnings per share for a two-year forecast horizon times LTG (x 100). LTG = consensus (median) projected long-term growth in earnings. P = share price on the date of the consensus recommendation calculation. SAR = annual size-adjusted return beginning the month following the recommendation. MVE = market value of equity. NUM = number of analysts following. a Pearson correlations before (after) Reg FD are above (below) the diagonal. b Pearson correlations before (after) other regulations are above (below) the diagonal. 
, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the independent variables. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). RegFD equals 1 if an observation is in the post- Reg FD period (2000 -2005 and zero otherwise (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Other variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on two-tailed ttests. The table presents the results of regressions of consensus stock recommendations on valuation estimates. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. tstatistics are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR(1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor,
, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the independent variables. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). OtherReg equals 1 if an observation is in the post-other regulation period (2003) (2004) (2005) and zero otherwise (2000) (2001) (2002) . Other variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on two-tailed ttests. The table presents the results of regressions of buy-and-hold annual size-adjusted returns on valuation estimates and consensus stock recommendations. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. t-statistics are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR (1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the independent variables. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). RegFD equals 1 if an observation is from the post-Reg FD period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) and zero otherwise (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Other independent variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests. The table presents the results of regressions of buy-and-hold annual size-adjusted returns on valuation estimates and consensus stock recommendations. Regressions are estimated based on one-year-ahead earnings forecast horizon (i.e., months t-1 to t-12). The table presents mean coefficients for these 12 monthly regressions. t-statistics are based on the standard error of the coefficient estimates across the 12 months, adjusted for autocorrelation in the monthly coefficients based on as assumed AR (1) autocorrelation structure. Standard errors are multiplied by an adjustment factor, where n is the number of months and Φ is the first-order autocorrelation of the monthly coefficient estimates. Adjusted R 2 s presented are means across the 12 months. The regressions are estimated using quintile rankings of the independent variables. The quintile rankings are designated by allocating observations in equal numbers to quintiles within each month. The quintile rankings are scaled to range between 0 and 1 (e.g., (QUINTLE-1)/4)). OtherReg equals 1 if an observation is in the post-other regulation period (2003) (2004) (2005) and zero otherwise (2000) (2001) (2002) . Other variables are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests.
